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EVIDENCE-EFFECt OF CommENT ON R=EFUSAL OF Co-INDicrsi To TEs-
Tn -Defendant, a physician, was indicted jointly with Grubbs, para-
mour of the prosecutrix, for attempted abortion. The trials, upon
motion of Grubbs, were held separately. At defendant's trial Grubbs,
the co-indictee, was called to testify by defendant, but refused to
answer questions regarding the circumstances of the alleged crime by
invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. The Commonwealth's
Attorney, in his closing argument to the jury, dwelt at length upon
Grubbs' refusal to testify. Defendant was convicted, and appealed.
Held: Reversed, due to the erroneous comment. Dotye v. Common-
wealth, 289 S.W. 2d 206 (Ky. 1956).
The Court, while declining to formulate an absolute rule against
comment on the co-indictee's refusal to testify when called by de-
fendant, did hold that elaboration on such refusal by the Common-
wealth's Attorney was improper.' It is well established in Kentucky,
both by statute2 and decision,3 that comment on defendant's failure to
testify in his own behalf is prejudicial error. It is equally certain that
failure of defendant to call as a witness his co-defendant, or co-indictee,
is the subject of proper comment.4 But the specific issue decided in
this case, i.e., whether elaboration by the prosecuting attorney on the
refusal of defendant's co-indictee to testify is prejudicial error, has
never previously been before the Court in this jurisdiction.5
The bases for the distinction between the situation where the
defendant himself fails to testify and where he fails to call his co-
1 The appeal was based on several grounds. In addition to prejudicial com-
ment by the Commonwealth's Attorney, defendant alleged error due to insifficient
proof of pregnancy, improper admission of medical records, interjection of racial
prejudice and election of Commonwealth to prosecute for a lesser offense than the
proof indicated. The Court disposed of each of these contentions.2 Ky. Rev. Stat. 455.090 (1955). "(1) In any criminal or penal prosecution
the defendant, on his own request, shall be allowed to testify in his own behalf,
but his failure to do so shall not be commented upon or create any presumption
against him."
3 Gray v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 307, 242 S.W. 8 (1922); Williams v.
Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 659, 154 S.W. 2d 728 (1941).
4 McElwain v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 104, 142 S.W. 234 (1912); Davis v.
Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 242, 229 S.W. 1029 (1921).
5 Several cases have, however, hypothesized the situation and anticipated the
result here by way of dictum. See, e.g., Thomas v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 605,
78 S.W. 2d 777, 781 (1934); and McElwain v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 104, 108,
142 S.W. 234, 237 (1912).
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defendant or co-indictee are the constitutional safeguards against self-
incrimination," under which the defendant is protected from compul-
sion to convict himself out of his own mouth. To comment on the
failure of the defendant to testify, with the open implication that such
failure was an indication of guilt would clearly contravene the con-
stitutional prohibition. But comment on defendants failure to call a
co-indictee, merely as a witness, does not violate constitutional safe-
guards because calling the co-indictee is considered not to involve any
degree of self-incrimination.
7
This issue was plainly presented in Davis v. Commonwealth,8 where
the defendant and one Knipper were jointly indicted for grand larceny.
The defendant was granted a separate trial and the Commonwealth's
Attorney, in his argument, commented on the failure of the defendant
to call his co-indictee as a witness. On appeal, the Court interpreted
the statute prohibiting comment on defendant's failure to testify in his
own behalf as relating only to the defendant, and stated:
Although Knipper and appellant were jointly indicted for the larceny,
appellant had demanded a separate trial . . . and there seems no
sound reason why the commonwealth may not on the trial of a
defendant comment upon his failure to introduce a witness who was
available for that purpose and who is shown by the other evidence
to have knowledge of the transaction involved.9
The effect of this decision seems to be that a co-defendant or co-
indictee is to be treated as any other witness insofar as comment on the
defendant's failure to call is concerned. The propriety of comment on
the defendant's failure to offer other witnesses on defense matters is
unquestioned.10
The question presented by the instant case appears to lie between
the previously-discussed situations. On the one hand, it may be argued
that where the trial is by joint indictment, the refusal of a co-indictee
to testify on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him is a cir-
cumstance which may be considered to indicate the guilt of the de-
fendant, and in no manner can be said to violate the rights of the
defendant against self-incrimination. On the other hand, the law is
6 Constitution of Ky., sec. 11 (1891).
7 However, some jurisdictions do hold that the failure of defendant to call a co-
defendant to testify is not the proper subject of comment. State v. Weaver, 165
Mo. 1, 65 S.W. 308 (1901).
8 Davis v. Commonwealth, note 4, supra.
9 Id. at 246.
30 Ridner v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 557, 46 S.W. 2d 1102 (1932); Thomas
v. Commonwealth, note 5, supra; Francis v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 318; 224
S.W. 2d 163 (1949).
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plain that no witness may be compelled to give testimony which would
tend in any degree to prove his guilt of a criminal offense. The mere
exercise of this privilege by a witness should not be considered as a
logical basis for legitimate inference of the guilt of the defendant and
comment by the prosecuting attorney that it is evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt is clearly prejudicial."
As to refusal of witnesses in general to testify on the ground of self-
incrimination, the rule is well settled that when a witness other than
the accused refuses to testify on the ground that the answer would tend
to incriminate him, the mere refusal cannot be made the basis of any
comment before the jury from which an inference, either favorable
to the prosecution or favorable to the defense, might be drawn. 2
An excellent example of the application and rationalization of this
rule is the case of Powers v. State.13 In that case the defendant was
charged with adultery, and his partner in crime refused to testify when
called. The prosecution commented on the refusal in the closing argu-
ment, asserting such refusal was indicative of guilt. The Court held
the comment to be prejudicial error and by example illustrated the
possible injustices of a rule allowing such comment.
While the refusal of the co-indictee might be technically dis-
tinguished from the Powers case, in that in the latter case the witness
was not indicted and was called by the state, it seems completely
logical that the rule formulated there should also be applicable to the
co-indictee situation.
The defendant's guilt should be established on fact whenever pos-
sible and never on unwarranted inference from another's refusal to
testify. Too, the position that refusal to testify can only imply guilt is
fallacious, since humiliation, disgrace, or actual desire to see the de-
fendant convicted might motivate the witness' invocation of the privi-
lege.14 The contention of a prosecuting attorney in argument that the
refusal of a witness, even a co-indictee, to testify is material to the
establishment of guilt of another is obviously a mere supposition. It
cannot in any legitimate degree be considered as actually providing
the basis for a logical inference of the guilt of the party on trial.
Thus it seems that the basic position of the Kentucky Court in the
instant case is sound and in accord with the generally accepted prin-
ciples of restricting comment to material matters sustained by evi-
l1 53 Am. Jur. see. 479, page 385 (1945).
1224 A.L.R. 2d 896 (1952).
1375 Neb. 226, 106 N.W. 332 (1905).
14 Id. at 333-334.
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dence.' 5 While the Court, in refusing to lay down a specific rule
against comment on refusal of a co-indictee to testify and emphasizing
the elaboration of the comment in the instant case, somewhat limited
its holding, it does extend protection to the accused from prejudicial
comments by over-zealous prosecutors.
L. F. Martin, Jr.
CONsTITUTONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT PROCEED-
INc-Appellant, fifteen years old, was charged with having used an
automobile without the owner's consent. At a hearing before the juve-
nile Court, he admitted the charge and was committed to a training
school. Appellant was not represented by counsel, nor was he advised
that he might be so represented. Some three months after the hearing,
counsel appeared for him and filed a motion to vacate the court's judg-
ment on the ground that appellant had been deprived of his constitu-
tional right to counsel. Denial of the motion was appealed to the
Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which af-
firmed the Juvenile Court's judgment.' Upon appeal the United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, Held: Reversed and remanded.
The Juvenile Court was required to inform the delinquent that he had
a right to counsel. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F. 2d 666
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
Are juvenile court proceedings of such a nature as to require the
furnishing of constitutional guaranties of fair criminal procedure to
offenders appearing therein? This is the basic question underlying the
principal case. While the court decided only the narrow question of
the right to counsel in such proceedings, the broader question would
seem to be correlative to the narrow one. The court in holding that
one appearing before a juvenile court has a right to counsel, speci-
fically refused to reach consideration of the due process requirements
involved,2 but the tenor of the opinion leads to the conclusion that had
the question of the right to constitutional guaranties in general been
presented, the court would have answered in the affirmative. The
opinion reviewed the purpose of the District of Columbia statute
15 23 C.J.S. 551 (1940).
1 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 114 A. 2d 896 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C.1955).2 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 286 F. 2d 666, 669 n. 18 (D.C. Cir.
1956). The court based its holding on the "right to be heard" provision of the
D.C. Code sec. 11-915 (1951).
